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Abstract Modern constitutionalism is based on the paradigm that courts are inher-
ently entitled and obliged to enforce the constitution of the respective polity. This
responsibility of courts also applies in the context of the European Union to both the
CJEU and national constitutional courts. The present chapter argues that in the face
of constitutional crises the CJEU and the Hungarian Constitutional Court shy away
from applying the law as it is to the full. The reasons behind this unwarranted judicial
self-restraint are most different: the CJEU aims to avoid conflicts with national
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constitutional courts whereas the Hungarian Constitutional Court has been facing a
legislative power also acting as constitution making power willing to amend the
constitution to achieve specific legislative purposes or to undo previous constitu-
tional court decisions. Yet both courts respond to expediencies that do not follow
from the law they are called upon to apply. It is argued that rule of law backsliding
requires these courts to abandon the unnecessary self-restraint and exploit the means
already available.
1 Introduction
In the past several years, the European Union has been struggling with ensuring
respect for the rule of law in all member states. The political mechanism envisaged
by Article 7 TEU has thus far proved to be ineffective, there being only two instances
of triggering this procedure, on 20 December 2017, by the Commission in respect of
Poland,1 and on 12 September 2018, by the European Parliament in respect of
Hungary.2 No visible progress can be detected in any of these cases. Equally, the
Rule of Law Framework set out by the European Commission in 2014 has been
activated only once, and even the European Commission acknowledges that ‘it did
not solve the detected rule of law deficiencies’ in Poland.3 The recent communica-
tion of the European Commission on further strengthening the Rule of Law within
the Union4 tries to move forward the debate, but fails to provide any specifics on how
the system on enforcing the rule of law may become more effective.
It occurs that the political enforcement mechanisms have failed to deliver a
sensible result.5 This inevitably shifts the focus to the courts that are entrusted
with the task of ensuring respect for foundational constitutional values. In the
European Union context, this court is most importantly the CJEU which is called
upon by virtue of Article 19 (1) TEU to ‘ensure that in the interpretation and
application of the Treaties the law is observed.’ Besides, national constitutional
courts also bear responsibility for maintaining the values common to the Member
States of the EU, including the rule of law, respect for human rights and democracy.
This common responsibility—which is of legal and constitutional nature—applies
irrespective of political pressures or eventual repercussions.
1Proposal for a Council Decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the
Republic of Poland of the rule of law (COM(2017) 835 final, 20.12.2017).
2European Parliament resolution of 12 September 2018 calling on the Council to determine,
pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious
breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded (2017/2131(INL)).
3Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the
Council, Further strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union, State of play and possible next
steps, Brussels, 3.4.2019, (COM(2019) 163 final) p. 3.
4Id.
5Kochenov and Bárd (2018).
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That courts are at the centre of maintaining the rule of law is also recognised by
the recent case law of the CJEU on the independence of the national judiciary.
Starting with the seminal ASJP judgment on the Portuguese judges association6 and
leading up to the ruling on the Polish law on the Supreme Court7 the CJEU made it
clear that an independent and effective judiciary is indispensable for ensuring the
application of EU law in the Member States and ultimately for maintaining the
membership of the respective Member States in the EU. Judicial independence, is,
however, just a bare minimum which does not on its own guarantee a proper
interpretation and application of the law.8 What if judges respond to unspoken
expectations and political realities and fail to exhaust their full capacity to protect
the fundamental values they shall maintain in their respective constitutional order?
What if courts exercise self-restraint that does not follow from the language and the
context of the constitutional document they are supposed to enforce? What if this
self-restraint ultimately undermines the coherence of the polity these courts are
supposed to serve?
This chapter tells the tale of two courts in utterly different positions yet demon-
strating a certain similarity in self-restraint in exploiting the means at their hands.
These two courts are, on the one hand, the CJEU, and, on the other, the Hungarian
Constitutional Court. It is not submitted that these two courts would have a compa-
rable mandate or an even a vaguely similar political environment. What is common
is their reluctance to take the risk inherent in applying the law to the fullest extent.
This reluctance has far reaching consequences for both the legal system of the EU
and of Hungary.
In the following I shall first outline the interpretation of Article 51 (1) CFR by the
CJEU and the consequences of this restrictive interpretation to Hungary in such
important areas as the freedom of the press, the independence of the judiciary and of
the data protection commissioner (Sect. 2). In the second part of the chapter, I will
argue that the Hungarian Constitutional Court still has powerful and mostly unused
opportunities at disposal to control the legislative power, even if this legislative
power acts most of the time as constitution making power, and frequently amends
the Basic Law in order to achieve specific policy objectives or to counter decisions of
the Constitutional Court (Sect. 3). In conclusion I submit that rule of law crises call
for a more robust and courageous approach by both the CJEU and constitutional
courts.
6CJEU Case C-264/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, Judgment of the Court of
27 February 2018.
7CJEU Case C-619/18, European Commission v. Poland, Judgment of the Court of 24 June 2019.
8Cf. from the perspective of the internal independence of judges Avbelj (2019).
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2 Narrowing the Charter’s Applicability: Article
51 (1) CFR
2.1 Siragusa, Hernández: Context and Consequences
The evolution of the case law of the CJEU on Article 51 (1) CFR need not be retold
here. It is, however, necessary to recall the context and consequences of the shift
from the Åkerberg Fransson judgment9 to the Siragusa and Hernandez case law in
order to assess the implications of this shift for situations in which the rule of law is
threatened.
Åkerberg Fransson was certainly an attempt by the CJEU to return to a case law
that existed long before the framing of the Charter. Since the ERT judgment it has
been the consistent case-law that general principles apply to Member States in
situations falling within the scope of application of EU law.10 In fact, the decisive
paragraph of the Åkerberg Fransson judgment quotes the langue of the ERT
judgment literally.11 By that, the CJEU actually followed the explanations to Article
51 (1) CFR which describe the framing of the relevant part of this provision as an
expression of the previous case law of the Court.12
In contrast, it was submitted especially in German scholarship before13 and
after14 the Åkerberg Fransson judgment that the framers of the Charter intended to
correct the breadth of the application of EU fundamental rights suggested by the ERT
case law by using the term ‘implement’ in Article 51 (1) CFR. For this view, the
explanations to the Charter have a questionable status as on the basis of Article
9CJEU, Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, Judgment of 26 February 2013, para. 19.
10CJEU, Case C-260/89 ERT, Judgment of the Court of 18 June 1991, para. 42.
11The Court ‘has no power to examine the compatibility with the European Convention on Human
Rights of national rules which do not fall within the scope of Community law. On the other hand,
where such rules do fall within the scope of Community law, and reference is made to the Court for
a preliminary ruling, it must provide all the criteria of interpretation needed by the national court to
determine whether those rules are compatible with the fundamental rights the observance of which
the Court ensures’, ERT, supra note 10, para. 42, Åkerberg Fransson supra note 9, para. 19.
12Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Explanation on Article 51—Field of
application ‘As regards the Member States, it follows unambiguously from the case-law of the
Court of Justice that the requirement to respect fundamental rights defined in the context of the
Union is only binding on the Member States when they act in the scope of Union law (judgment of
13 July 1989, Case 5/88 Wachauf [1989] ECR 2609; judgment of 18 June 1991, Case C-260/89
ERT [1991] ECR I-2925; judgment of 18 December 1997, Case C-309/96 Annibaldi [1997] ECR
I-7493). The Court of Justice confirmed this case-law in the following terms: ‘In addition, it should
be remembered that the requirements flowing from the protection of fundamental rights in the
Community legal order are also binding on Member States when they implement Community rules
. . .’ (judgment of 13 April 2000, Case C-292/97 [2000] ECR I-2737, paragraph 37 of the grounds)’
OJ 14.12.2007 C 303/32.
13Huber (2008), p. 197.
14Schorkopf (2014), para. 26; also Hancox (2013), p. 1411.
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52 (7) CFR they only need be considered to provide guidance in the interpretation of
the Charter.15
This debate would have not had particular bearings if only the German
Bundesverfassungsgericht did not take up the issue only two months after Åkerberg
Fransson in its judgment on the counter-terrorism database.16 Here Karlsruhe went
as far as to use the term ‘ultra vires’ in relation to the Åkerberg Fransson judgment
and advised Luxemburg that ‘[t]he decision must thus not be understood and applied
in such a way that absolutely any connection of a provision’s subject-matter to the
merely abstract scope of Union law, or merely incidental effects on Union law,
would be sufficient for binding the Member States by the Union’s fundamental rights
set forth in the EUCFR.’17
The Siragusa and Hernandez judgments can be understood in this context. In
Siragusa the CJEU in essence requires the assessment of the following for the
applicability of the Charter against Member States: whether that legislation is
intended to implement a provision of EU law; the nature of that legislation and
whether it pursues objectives other than those covered by EU law, even if it is
capable of indirectly affecting EU law; and also whether there are specific rules of
EU law on the matter or capable of affecting it.18 In essence it needs be ascertained
whether there is an EU law obligation on Member States with regard to the situation
at issue.19 This ‘specific obligation’ test was soon articulated more clearly in the
Hernandez judgment20 and can now be regarded as the guiding interpretation of
Article 51 (1).
It may occur that the CJEU still relies on the Åkerberg Fransson doctrine, as the
judgment has been referred to in the case law several times even after the Siragusa
judgment. Nevertheless, a closer look reveals that Åkerberg Fransson is not invoked
to exploit the ‘scope of application’ doctrine. Rather, Åkerberg Fransson is quoted to
deny the applicability of the Charter,21 or in a solely VAT related context.22 The only
exception to this pattern is Delvigne, where the Court ultimately found the Charter to
be applicable relying on Åkerberg Fransson because the member state in question
was implementing its obligation under Article 14(3) TEU and Article 1(3) of the
15Schorkopf (2014), para. 26.
16BVerfG 133, 277.
17BVerfG 133, 277, 316 para. 91. For a detailed analyses and critical appraisal see Thym (2013),
p. 391 et seq.
18CJEU, Case C-206/13 Siragusa, Judgment of the Court of 6 March 2014, para. 25.
19Siragusa, supra note 18, para. 26.
20CJEU, Case C-198/13 Hernández, Judgment of the Court of 10 July 2014, para. 35.
21CJEU, Case C-265/13, Torralbo Marcos, Judgment of the Court of 27 March 2014, para. 30;
CJEU, Cases C-650/13 and C-395/15 Mohamed Daouidi v. Bootes Plus SL and Others, Judgment
of the Court of 1 December 2016, paras. 63–64; CJEU, Case C-638/16 PPU, X and X v. État belge,
Judgment of 7 March 2017, para. 45.
22CJEU, Case C-42/17, M.A.S. and M.B., Judgment of 5 December 2017, para. 31.
The Responsibility of Courts in Maintaining the Rule of Law: Two Tales of. . . 159
1976 Act while excluding certain convicted EU citizens from the right to vote in the
elections to the European Parliament.23
The Court gets closest to applying the ‘scope of application’ doctrine in cases
where it deals with the classic ERT scenario in which the member state is relying on
grounds envisaged in the TFEU or on overriding reasons in the public interest that
are recognised by EU law in order to justify the obstruction of one or more
fundamental freedoms by the member state.24
It is fair to state that the ‘scope of application doctrine’ would have given more
teeth to the Charter as an instrument of protecting the constitutional values enshrined
in Article 2. It may seem somewhat exaggerated to assume that Åkerberg Fransson
would subject a nearly unlimited breadth of Member States competencies to the
application of the Charter.25 Nevertheless the scope of application doctrine would
definitely have yielded a more flexible approach and a far more effective enforce-
ment of the basic values of Article 2 against Member States.
Especially damming are the underlying considerations behind the restrictive
‘specific obligations’ doctrine. According to Siragusa, the reason for pursuing the
objective of fundamental rights protection by the EU is ‘the need to avoid a situation
in which the level of protection of fundamental rights varies according to the national
law involved in such a way as to undermine the unity, primacy and effectiveness of
EU law.’26 According to this, the CJEU still seems to regard the protection of
fundamental rights as a necessary evil to protect the supremacy of EU law from
fundamental rights based challenges by national constitutional courts. Fundamental
rights are thus not protected following the mandate of Article 2 TEU, but as a matter
of expediency for the uniform application of EU law. To put the message bluntly:
the CJEU will protect fundamental rights in order to prevent interferences by the
constitutional courts but will not take it as far as to disturb the sensitivity of the very
same constitutional courts, especially the Bundesverfassungsgericht.
In the following I shall demonstrate how the restrictive approach of the CJEU in
relation to the interpretation of Article 51 (1) impacted the handling the case of
Hungary and how it did not serve the promotion of the rule of law in the EU.
23CJEU, Case C-650/13, Delvigne, Judgment of the Court of 6 October 2015, para. 27–33.
24CJEU, Case C-201/15, AGET Iraklis, Judgment of the Court of 21 December 2016, paras. 62–63;
CJEU, Case C-235/17, Commission v. Hungary, Judgment of 21 May 2019, paras. 64–65.
25Schorkopf (2014), para. 26.
26Case C-206/13 Cruciano Siragusa v. Regione Sicilia – Soprintendenza Beni Culturali e
Ambientali di Palermo Judgment of the Court of 20 March 2014, para. 32 ‘The reason for pursuing
that objective is the need to avoid a situation in which the level of protection of fundamental rights
varies according to the national law involved in such a way as to undermine the unity, primacy and
effectiveness of EU law.’
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2.2 Consequences of the Restrictive Interpretation of 51
(1) CFR Until 2017 in Hungary
Against the above outlined background, it does not come as a surprise that until
December 2017 the European Commission attempted to intervene with undesired
constitutional developments in Hungary by means of an infringement procedure
only in three cases. All three cases addressed issues of primary importance for the
rule of law and democracy: the freedom of the press, the independence of the
judiciary and the independence of the date protection commissioner. Out of these
only two made it to a judgment by the CJEU, and none was based on the Charter.27
2.2.1 The Media Law
One of the first steps of reshaping the legal landscape in Hungary in 2010 was to
adopt new laws on print and electronic media: Act CIV of 9 November 2010 on the
freedom of the press and the fundamental rules on media content (Press Freedom
Act)28 and Act CLXXXV of 30 December 2010 on media services and on the mass
media (Mass Media Act). These laws raised a number of grave concerns from the
perspective of the freedom of the press.29 To name a few, the new regulation
provided for an obligation to register for all media, including print, electronic and
online media;30 it obliged all media to provide balanced coverage;31 it contained a
general, broadly framed content based prohibitions for all media to protect vaguely
defined concepts as human dignity,32 human rights and privacy;33 it reduced signif-
icantly the protection for sources, created the position of a Media Ombudsman
giving it vaguely defined sanctioning powers and it authorised the newly created
National Media and Infocommunications Authority to impose severe sanctions.34
The President of the National Media and Infocommunications Authority was to be
appointed for the unusually long term of nine years (more than two legislative
periods) by the President of the Republic.35
27Article 47 (2) EU Charter (right to a fair trial before an independent and impartial tribunal); Article
8 (3) EU Charter (guarantee of an independent data protection authority).
28For an English translation of the original text see http://cmcs.ceu.hu/sites/default/files/domain-69/
cmcs-archive/act_civ_media_content.pdf.
29For a critical appraisal see Polyák (2015), p. 125 et seq.
30Sec. 41 (4) Mass Media Act as of 31 December 2010.
31Sec. 13. Press Freedom Act and Sec. 12 (1) Mass Media Act as of 31 December 2010.
32On this specific aspect see Koltay (2013), p. 823 et seq.
33Part Two Chapter I Mass Media Act as of 31 December 2010.
34Secs. 185–187 Mass Media Act as of 31 December 2010.
35Sec. 111/A. (1) Mass Media Act.
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It is by no surprise that the European Commission reacted quickly and strongly to
the new legislation.36 Already on 23 December 2010 Neelie Kroes, vice-president of
the European Commission addressed her Hungarian counterpart in a letter, stating
her concerns in general terms.37 This letter was followed by a more detailed one on
21 January 201138 requiring clarifications of three issues.39 The Hungarian side gave
in rapidly in all points raised by the Commission. Although the amending legislation
was only adopted on 7 March and published in the Official Gazette on 22 March
2011,40 Commission Vice-President Kroes welcomed the planned amendments to
Hungarian Media Law already on 16 February in a press release.41
Notably, these amendments did not address many general concerns relating to the
freedom of the press and focused on those aspects that had a direct link to European
Union law.42 Especially telling is the exclusion of the Charter of the discussion
between the Commission and Hungary.
36For a highly informative collection of relevant documents, see https://cmcs.ceu.hu/node/
26249#euro. See also Hoffmeister (2015), p. 195 et seq.
37See http://www.kormany.hu./download/8/01/10000/kroes.pdf. According to the letter: ‘Indepen-
dent regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector have an important role to play to ensure the
existence of a wide range of independent and autonomous media. Concerns have been expressed by
numerous commentators that the recently adopted Media Act risks jeopardising the rights by giving
very broad competences to the Media Authority. These same commentators also allege that the
composition of the Media Authority does not seem to guarantee its independence. In addition,
doubts have been raised about some of the provisions of the Act which apparently are applicable to
broadcasters established in other Member States, which raises potential questions of coherence with
one of the basic principles of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive.’
38See http://cmcs.ceu.hu/sites/default/files/domain-69/cmcs-archive/EC_lettertoHungary_
2011Jan21.pdf.
39These included the obligation to provide balanced coverage applicable to all audiovisual media
service providers on the basis of Sec. 13. Press Freedom Act and Sec. 12 (1) Mass Media Act, the
power of the National Media and Infocommunications Authority to impose fines and other
sanctions on media service providers established in another member states of the EU on the basis
of Sec. 176 ad 177 Mass Media Act, as well as the requirement in Sec. 41 Mass Media Act that all
media, in particular press and online media be registered. The Commission and the Hungarian
authorities held thereafter meetings in Brussels at experts level between on 7th February and 15th
February.
40A sajtószabadságról és a médiatartalmak alapvető szabályairól szóló 2010. évi CIV. törvény és a
médiaszolgáltatásokról és a tömegkommunikációról szóló 2010. évi CLXXXV. törvény
módosításáról szóló 2011. évi XIX. törvény.
41See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-89_en.htm.
42The amendments agreed included the following:
– limitation of the balanced coverage requirements to broadcasting, these no longer apply to
on-demand media services;
– broadcasters and other audiovisual media service providers legally established and authorised in
other Member States can no longer be fined for breaching the Hungarian Media Law’s pro-
visions on incitement to hatred;
– on-demand audiovisual media service providers, media product publishers and ancillary media
service providers established in Hungary and in other Member States are no longer subject to
prior authorisation by the Hungarian authorities;
– the prohibition not to cause offence to individuals, minorities or majorities is limited to situations
of incitement to hatred or discrimination.
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In her first relevant letter of 23 December 2010 Vice-President Kroes seemed to
take a broader approach which would have warranted the examination of the
Hungarian legislation on the basis of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. First, the
letter expressed the understanding that the media legislation ‘primarily aims to
transpose the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (Directive 2010/13/EU)’. It
then continued by stating that ‘[t]he freedom of expression constitutes one of the
essential foundations of our democratic societies[. . .] Media pluralism, freedom of
expression and press freedom are underlying elements of European democracy
guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights.’43 This opening could be under-
stood as paving the way for the application of Art. 51 (1) of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights inasmuch it referred to the Hungarian legislation as an imple-
mentation of EU law.
In contrast, the following letter of 21 January 2011 took a narrow approach and
only relied on specific provisions of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive as
well as on the freedom of establishment and the free provision of services guaranteed
by Art. 49 and 56 TFEU.44 This letter made no mention of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights whatsoever.
2.2.2 The Forced Retirement of Justices
Until the entry into force of the Basic Law, relevant legislation essentially allowed
judges to remain in office until the age of 70. The Basic Law provided in its Article
26(2) that ‘with the exception of the President of the Kúria, judges may remain in
office until the general retirement age’. This provision was supplemented by Article
12(1) of the Transitional Provisions. With these provisions, applied together with the
relevant pension legislation, the constitution-maker tied the cessation of the mandate
of the judges to the general retirement age, which in 2012 was 62 years and would
progressively increase up until 2022, when it will be 65 years. As a result, around
10% of all judges, including many in leading positions, were forced to leave office
within a year.
The Constitutional Court was confronted with the forced retirement of judges in
its Decision 33/2012 (VII.17) AB.45 The Court declared the sudden reduction of the
upper age limit for judges unconstitutional on the grounds that it was a breach of
judicial independence protected by article 26(1) of the Basic Law. Ultimately, the
Decision annulled the statutory provisions on early retirement with ex tunc effect.
The implementation of this judgment has resulted in considerable legal uncertainty.
The legal basis of forced retirement was declared null and void, but this did not




45Kocsis (2013), p. 556.
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dismissed the judges. What is more, the President of the National Judicial Office did
not initiate a procedure to reinstate those who had been removed, and without an
appropriate proposal the President of the Republic could not repeal the previous
decisions. Even if a justice was reinstated, by that time the leading positions were
already filled.
The European Commission and the CJEU also reacted to the issue of early
retirement, but in a different context. The lowering of the mandatory retirement
age of judges from 70 to 62 was addressed by the European Commission as
discrimination in the workplace on grounds of age in the light of the rules on
equal treatment in employment (Directive 2000/78/EC).46 The CJEU acceded to
the position of the European Commission and ruled that the relevant national
legislation gives rise to a difference in treatment on grounds of age which is neither
appropriate nor necessary to attain the objectives pursued and therefore does not
comply with the principle of proportionality.47 Judicial independence or Article
47 CFR were not addressed.
In response, Hungary, taking into account the previous decision of the Hungarian
Constitutional Court as well, amended the legislation on the legal status of the
judges, and it introduced a new method of calculation, setting the retirement age to
between 65 and 70, depending on the date of birth of the judge. The law also set forth
a unified retirement age calculation method for judges, prosecutors and notaries.48
Nevertheless, only a small number of judges requested to be reinstated, and none of
them regained the leading position they previously possessed.
2.2.3 The Removal of the Data Protection Commissioner
The six-year term of the incumbent Data Protection Commissioner was prematurely
terminated by Article 16 of the Transitional Provisions on the day of the entry into
force of the Basic Law on 1 January 2012. This came along with the creation of a
new National Agency for Data Protection to replace the current Data Protection
Commissioner’s Office.
This move was challenged by the European Commission before the CJEU. In its
action submitted on 8 June 2012, the Commission relied on Article 28(1) of Direc-
tive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of
46Letter from Vice-President Viviane Reding to Vice-Prime Minister Tibor Navracsics (Brussels,
12 December 2011), available at www.lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/hungary/letter_from_vp_of_
the_european_commission.pdf. European Commission Press Release, ‘European Commission
Launches Accelerated Infringement Proceedings against Hungary over the Independence of its
Central Bank and Data Protection Authorities as well as over Measures affecting the Judiciary’
(Strasbourg, 17 January 2012), available at www.europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference¼IP/12/24.
47C-286/12 Commission v Hungary, Judgment of the Court of 6 November 2012, para. 48 et seq.
48Act XX of 2013 (2013. évi XX. törvény az egyes igazságügyi jogviszonyokban alkalmazandó
felső korhatárral kapcsolatos törvénymódosításokról).
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personal data and on the free movement of such data and argued that the removal
from office before time of the authority responsible for supervising data protection
undermines the independence required by the Directive of that authority.49 The
judgment of the CJEU on 8 April 2014 confirmed this.50 It is remarkable that the
central concern in the case was actually orchestrated as a matter of the personal fate
of the previous Commissioner, and not as a matter of principle. Besides, the
judgment does not mention Article 8 (3) CFR which, in the light of Article
51 (1) CFR has the potential to be interpreted as referring also to national supervi-
sory authorities.
2.3 Article 19 (1) TEU as a Partial Supplement for a Broad
Interpretation of Article 51 (1)
By the time Polish constitutional developments took a turn in 2015, the forced
retirement of justices and the removal of the data protection commissioner were
the only cases where an infringement procedure was initiated against Hungary for
concerns relating to the values listed in Art. 2 TEU. They show a pattern which can
be best characterised by recourse to narrow internal market related provisions and by
strictly avoiding the conflicts that may arise from the application of the Charter to a
member state. This approach clearly reflects the Siragusa and Hernández line of
cases and the expediencies following from the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s stance on
fundamental rights protection by the CJEU.
By that, the CJEU clearly had ignored that protection against removal from office
is one of the most important aspects of independence of the judiciary or of any other
independent office. In relation to the judiciary, the European Court of Human Rights
has repeatedly made it clear that the irremovability of judges by the executive during
their term of office must in general be considered as a corollary of their independence
and thus included in the guarantees of the right to a fair trial.51 This does not
necessarily mean that this irremovability must under all circumstances be formally
declared in law. It suffices that the irremovability is recognised in fact and that the
other necessary guarantees are present.52 From this it follows that independence
presupposes a general protection from removal from office except in cases clearly
and narrowly defined by law relating to the misconduct or lack of capabilities of the
person bearing the office.
49CJEU, Case C-288/12, Commission v Hungary [2012] OJ C227/15–16.
50CJEU, Case C-288/12, Commission v. Hungary, Judgment of the Court of 8 April 2014.
51ECtHR, Campbell and Fell v United Kingdom, Judgment of 28 June 1984, Application no. 7819/
77; 7878/77 para. 80.
52Id., with reference to ECtHR, Engel and others, Judgment of 8 June 1976, Application no 5100/
71 para. 68.
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Irremovability is also considered an important guarantee of independence under
express provisions of EU law. With regard to the CJEU, Art 19 TEU and Art
254 TFEU stipulate the independence of the Justices of the Court. This is
supplemented by several provisions of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the
European Union. Amongst these, Article 5(1) provides that ‘[a]part from normal
replacement, or death, the duties of a Judge shall end when he resigns’. Article 6 of
the Statute only allows for removal from office if a Justice ‘no longer fulfils the
requisite conditions or meets the obligations arising from his office.’ As a procedural
safeguard in Article 6 of the Statute, decision on the removal may only be taken by a
unanimous Court and all Advocates General. Similar rules apply to members of the
European Commission. Article 17(3) III TEU declares that ‘in carrying out its
responsibilities, the Commission shall be completely independent.’ The Commis-
sion being a political organ with political responsibility, a motion of censure of the
Commission in the European Parliament is possible under Art 18(8) TEU. But the
independence of individual commissioners is protected by Art 247 TFEU which
only allows for the removal of individual commissioners if he or she ‘no longer
fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his duties or if he has been
guilty of serious misconduct.’
These considerations had to have a bearing as it became clear that Hungary will
not remain an isolated case and Poland would use the same legislative means to
change the composition of the judiciary. The decision in ASJP53 and the Commis-
sion v. Poland case on the Supreme Court54 clearly indicate this understanding.
Nevertheless Article 19 (1) TEU is not a vehicle to trigger the application of the
Charter through Article 51 (1) CFR.55 Rather, the second subparagraph of Article
19 (1) TEU is a stand-alone guarantee which shall be interpreted in the light of
Article 47 CFR. This was the position of the Commission at the hearing in the
Commission v. Poland case,56 and this follows from the operative parts of the
judgments in the same case and in the ASJP case. In ASJP the requesting court
sought an interpretation of Article 19 (1) and Article 47 CFR,57 but the CJEU merely
pronounced on the former.58 In Commission v. Poland, the operative part of the
judgment found solely a violation of the obligations following from the second
subparagraph of Article 19 (1) TEU, but did not establish a violation of Article
47 CFR.59 It is to be expected that the cases pending in relation to the judiciary in
Poland60 will be decided along the same lines.
53CJEU Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, supra note 6.
54CJEU Commission v. Poland, supra note 7.
55For a different view see Spieker (2019).
56CJEU Commission v. Poland, supra note 7, para. 32.
57CJEU Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, supra note 6, para. 1.
58CJEU Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, supra note 6, operative part.
59CJEU Commission v. Poland, supra note 7, operative part 1.
60See the case relating to the law on ordinary courts organisation—CJEU, Case C-192/18,
European Commission v. Republic of Poland, Opinion of AG Tanchev of 20 June 2019; the case
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2.4 Revival of ERT?
It follows that the CJEU regards the independence of the judiciary as an issue
completely separated from the application of the Charter to Member States. ASJP
thus has not broadened the applicability of the Charter to Member States. It is highly
questionable whether other vital elements of the rule of law protected by fundamen-
tal rights will still remain within the restraints of the Siragusa and Hernández
case law.
There are signs that the CJEU might take up the ERT case law in the stricter sense
and find the Charter applicable in situations where fundamental freedoms are
involved and Member States seem to rely on exceptions to such fundamental
freedoms. Examples can be found regarding Hungary, in relation to which the
European Commission launched three infringement procedures based on fundamen-
tal freedoms and the Charter. These include the following: (i) the case relating to the
amendment of the Act on National Higher Education affecting foreign universities,
most of all the Central European University;61 (ii) the case relating to the law on the
transparency of organisations that receive financial support from abroad;62 (iii) the
case of Act VI of 2018 on the amendment of certain laws relating to measures to
combat illegal immigration.63 Common to these cases is that the European Com-
mission relies on one of the fundamental freedoms and in connection with that
provisions of the Charter. In relation to the Act on National Higher Education the
freedom to provide services is invoked, and in relation to that Articles 13, 14(3) and
16 CFR. As regards the transparency of foreign funded organisations the vehicle is
the freedom of movement of capital, which seems to trigger the application of
Articles 7, 8 and 12 CFR. The case of Act VI of 2018 on the amendment of certain
laws relating to measures to combat illegal immigration the Commission invokes the
freedom of movement, whereas the press release on the reasoned opinion only refers
to the Charter in general terms.
As neither the reasoned opinions nor the applications of the Commission to the
CJEU are public, it is unclear whether the Commission indeed utilises the ERT
precedent to trigger the application of the Charter. Yet these cases certainly point in
that direction. It would mean that while the CJEU is not ready to apply the ‘scope of
application’ doctrine of the ERT and Åkerberg Fransson judgment to broaden the
applicability of the Charter to Member States in situations sensitive to the rule of law
in general, it sticks with the already established precedent of the ERT judgment if it is
applicable. This conclusion is reinforced by the already mentioned post-Siragusa
relating to the new disciplinary regime for Polish judges—Reasoned Opinion of the European
Commission of 17 July 2019, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-4189_en.htm.
61CJEU, Case C-66/18, Commission v Hungary, Action brought on 1 February 2018.
62CJEU, Case C-78/18, Commission v Hungary, Action brought on 1 June 2018.
63Reasoned opinion of the European Commission of 24 January 2019, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-19-469_EN.htm.
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and Hernández cases not involving systemic rule of law concerns where the CJEU
relied on the ERT precedent to invite the application of the Charter.64
3 UnusedMeans to Control the Constitution Making Power
3.1 The Convolution of Pouvoir Constituant and Pouvoir
Constitué
The circumstances of the activity of the Hungarian Constitutional Court could hardly
be more different than those of the CJEU. Out of the past ten years the governing
coalition in Hungary had a constitution making majority for about seven years
altogether.65 This majority did not refrain from amending the Constitution and
from 2012 the Basic Law. Between 2010 and 2012 the Constitution was amended
eight times. Following the adoption of a new Basic Law, seven different amendment
thereto were adopted within seven years. In other words, nine years have seen the
adoption of a new constitution (the Basic Law) and fifteen constitutional amend-
ments out of which seven affected the brand-new Basic Law.
Not only the statistics suggest a volatile constitutional environment. Almost all
constitutional amendments were borne out of immediate political needs and moti-
vations. With a few exceptions, they served to exclude or reduce the possibility of
challenging specific legislative projects before the Constitutional Court or attempted
to undo the results of previous Constitutional Court decisions.66 Especially the
curtailing of the competences of the Constitutional Court in tax matters by what is
now Article 37 (4) of the Basic Law and the Fourth Amendment made it clear that
the legislative power is ready to use its constitution making power to combat the
Constitutional Court.
As regards Article 37 (4) of the Basic Law, the restriction of the competences of
the Constitutional Court is certainly a very serious loophole in the Basic Law. This is
because Article 37(4) of the Basic Law excludes a wide range of laws on the central
budget, on the implementation of the budget, on central taxes, on duties and on
contributions, on customs duties, and on the central conditions for local taxes issues
from the competence of the Constitutional Court, and only allows for the review of
these on the basis of a limited list of fundamental rights, i.e. the rights to life and
human dignity, to the protection of personal data, to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion, and the rights related to Hungarian citizenship. This language arose out
of a conflict between Parliament and the Constitutional Court over a 98% punitive
tax charged on severance payments of dismissed civil servants and public employees
64See CJEU AGET Iraklis, supra note 24, paras 62–63; C-235/17, CJEU Commission v. Hungary,
supra note 24, paras. 64–65.
65May 2010 to February 2015, May 2018 to present (July 2020).
66Vincze (2014), p. 86.
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before the adoption of the Basic Law. In its Decision 184/2010 (X.28) AB67 the
Constitutional Court declared this punitive tax to be in violation of the right to
property, even though Parliament had previously specifically amended the Consti-
tution to cover the impugned legislation. Apparently, Parliament felt it necessary to
protect its prerogatives by stripping the power of the Constitutional Court to
adjudicate tax matters in the broad sense, and introduced Article 32/A(2) of the
Constitution, the language of which was identical to what is today Article 37 (4) of
the Basic Law.68
The Fourth Amendment was adopted in reaction to Decision 45/2012 (XII.29)
AB of the Constitutional Court which had declared the so-called transitory pro-
visions of the Basic Law unconstitutional. Accordingly, the most important part of
the Fourth Amendment was that it incorporated those provisions of the Transitional
Provisions into the text of the Basic Law that were previously annulled by the
Constitutional Court. These reinstated rules included substantive provisions, such
as the reallocation of cases by the President of the National Judicial Office (Article
27(4)), the possibility to reduce pensions of former communist leaders (Article U
(5)), and the suspension of the statute of limitations for crimes not prosecuted for
political reasons in the communist regime (Article U(6)). Besides these, the Fourth
Amendment included in Article U(1) of the Basic Law the previous Preamble to the
Transitional Provisions, which declared, inter alia, that the Hungarian Socialist
Workers’ Party (the communist party before 1989) bears responsibility for different
wrongdoings, including ‘the systematic destruction of European civilisation, legacy
and prominence’. What is more, the newly inserted Article U(1) also declares that
the successor of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, the Hungarian Socialist
Party (MSZP, which is at the present time the strongest opposition), shares the
responsibility of its predecessor.
However, the constitution-making power did not stop at undoing one single
Constitutional Court ruling. Rather, the Fourth Amendment basically reversed all
politically sensitive decisions handed down by the Constitutional Court after the
2010 elections. This was carried out by including specific exceptions to fundamental
rights provisions in the Basic Law based on which laws previously annulled by the
Constitutional Court can no longer be regarded as unconstitutional.
For example, the Fourth Amendment inserted the following provision into Article
L(1) of the Basic Law: ‘Hungary shall protect the institution of marriage as the union
of a man and a woman established by voluntary decision, and the family as the basis
of the nation’s survival. Family ties shall be based on marriage or the relationship
between parents and children.’
This was a direct response to Decision 43/2012 (XII.20) AB,69 in which the
Constitutional Court annulled section 7 of the Act on Protection of Families.
Section 7 had defined family as a system of relations that generates an emotional
67Constitutional Court of Hungary Decision 184/2010 (X.28) AB határozat para 900.
68I shall address this conflict in detail below at point 3.2.3.
69Constitutional Court of Hungary, Decision 43/2012 (XII.20) AB, para. 296.
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and economic community of natural persons, based on the marriage of a man and a
woman, next of kinship or adoptive guardianship. The Court found this concept of a
family too narrow as the state should also protect long-term emotional and economic
partnerships of persons living together (for example, those relationships in which the
couples raise and take care of each other’s children, or couples who do not have any
children or are not able to have any children, grandchildren cared for by grandpar-
ents, etc.).
Another reaction to one of the contemporary decisions of the Constitutional Court
was the amendment of Article VII(2) and (3) of the Basic Law which authorise
Parliament to recognise religious organisations as churches. Just ten days before the
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, in its Decision 6/2013 (III.1) AB, the Consti-
tutional Court decided, inter alia, that on the basis of freedom of religion Parliament
cannot be authorised to grant church status.70 Both of these will be elaborated on in
more detail in Sect. 3.2.
Similarly, to reverse a Constitutional Court Decision, Article XXII of the Basic
Law introduced an obligation of the state and local governments to strive for the
protection of homeless persons but at the same time granted authorisation for the
Parliament and the local governments to outlaw the use of certain specific sections of
public areas for habitation. This amendment was a reaction to Decision 38/2012
(XI.14) AB,71 in which the Constitutional Court reviewed the Petty Offence Act and
stated that the punishment of homeless people for living in a public area is in
violation of the right to human dignity. In the Court’s view, homelessness is a social
problem which the state must handle within the framework of social administration
and social care instead of punishment. Ultimately, therefore, the newly introduced
Article XXII(3) created an exception to the protection of human dignity concerning
homeless people at the level of the Basic Law.
Equally, the Fourth Amendment included a new paragraph in Article IX of the
Basic Law which explicitly allows for banning political advertisements from private
broadcasting in times of political campaign, thereby reversing Decision 45/2012
(XII.29) AB, discussed above. Besides this, the new Article IX(3) discourages
political advertising in private broadcasting by prohibiting media outlets from
charging for broadcasting political adverts, should they decide to air these.
What is more, some provisions of the Fourth Amendment relating to hate speech
aim to cut back a 20-year-old case law of the Constitutional Court. Between 1992
and 2008, the Constitutional Court found several laws to be unconstitutional that
aimed to penalise hate speech.72 As an answer to this, Article 5(2) of the Basic Law
stipulates that: ‘[t]he right to freedom of speech may not be exercised with the aim of
violating the dignity of the Hungarian nation or of any national, ethnic, racial or
70Constitutional Court of Hungary, Decision 6/2013 (III.1) AB para. 203.
71Constitutional Court of Hungary, Decision 38/2012 (XI.14) AB para. 185.
72See Constitutional Court of Hungary, Decision 30/1992 (V.26) AB; Constitutional Court of
Hungary, Decision 18/2004 (IV.25) AB; Constitutional Court of Hungary, Decision 95/2008
(VII.3) AB.
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religious community. Members of such communities shall be entitled to enforce their
claims in court against the expression of an opinion which violates their community,
invoking the violation of their human dignity as determined by law.’
In general, reversing several decisions of the Constitutional Court by constitu-
tional amendment resulted in a Basic Law packed with specific exceptions to
fundamental rights and provisions that are normally at the level of an ordinary
law. Not only did this lower the level of protection of fundamental rights, it also
had the aim of reducing the possibility of review by the Constitutional Court. And
above all, the Fourth Amendment sent an extraordinary strong message to the
Constitutional Court that no other power is supposed to control the legislative and
at the same time constitution making branch.
Under these circumstances it is fair to ask what role constitutional adjudication
can play. Is it at all possible to maintain a meaningful constitutional review, or is the
role of the Constitutional Court necessarily reduced to review politically
non-sensitive issues? Do we experience the development of a new, special Eastern
European type of the well-known political question doctrine? Naturally this ‘new
political question’ doctrine would not be a constitutional standard, rather the neces-
sity of judicial self-restraint in matters the actual legislative and constitution making
power would deem too important to be decided by anybody else than itself.
I submit that even under these difficult circumstances constitutional review is
possible. The Hungarian Constitutional Court had developed tools that are, to a
certain extent, capable of limiting the constitution making power or enable the Court
to adjudicate irrespective of the existing substantive and competence limitations.
As regards the limitation of the constitution-making power, the identity of the
Basic Law as well as international ius cogens serve as a standard (Sect. 3.2).
Constitutional adjudication is further possible in the present setting based on inter-
national human rights treaties, especially the European Convention on Human
Rights (Sect. 3.3).
3.2 Limits of the Constitution Making Power
The concept of an unconstitutional constitutional amendments is equally fascinating
and controversial, especially if the substantive limits to constitutional change are
implied73 and are not foreseen explicitly by the respective constitution. Declaring a
constitutional amendment to be unconstitutional by the constitutional court is not
only a harsh interference with popular sovereignty, but also comes dangerously close
to to a ‘juristocracy’74 and—due to the lacking standards against which constitu-
tional amendments can be reviewed (e.g. an explicit eternity clause)—even judicial
arbitrariness. It is therefore tempting for a constitutional court to seek objective and
73Jacobsohn (2006), p. 460 et seq.
74Hirschl (2007).
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relevant criteria in historic documents or European75 and international law. This
temptation may raise questions of legitimacy, but it can help overcoming accusations
that the respective constitutional court is inventing standards that do not exist.
It occurs that the case law of the Constitutional Court and ultimately the Basic
Law offer two different sets of supraconstitutional norms: the concept of constitu-
tional identity (Sect. 3.2.1) and international law. International law even has a double
role to play in this context: it is considered as a binding standard of interpretation of
constitutional provisions (Sect. 3.2.2) and constitutional amendments must conform
international jus cogens (Sect. 3.2.3).
3.2.1 Constitutional Identity
Constitutional identity is a new phenomenon in Hungarian law. It was first stipulated
in Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) of the Constitutional Court without an express
constitutional foundation and is now codified by the seventh amendment to the
Basic Law. The seventh amendment namely included a reference in the Preamble of
the Basic Law to the constitutional identity of Hungary. According to this new
language, ‘We hold that the protection of our identity rooted in our historic consti-
tution is a fundamental obligation of the State’. This is reinforced also in the
operative part of the Basic Law, as a new Article R (4) is included stating that ‘[t]
he protection of the constitutional identity of Hungary is an obligation of all organs
of the state.’
The contours of constitutional identity are rather vague. Decision 22/2016. (XII.
5.) states that the Constitutional Court ‘unfolds the content of this concept from case
to case, on the basis of the whole Fundamental Law and certain provisions thereof, in
accordance with the National Avowal and the achievements of our historical con-
stitution.’76 There is thus a close link between constitutional identity and the historic
constitution, which may be further reinforced by the seventh amendment to the Basic
Law declaring the constitutional identity of Hungary to be rooted in the historic
constitutions. Yet, there is a strong consensus in academia that the historic consti-
tution of Hungary is an empty shell, the content of which cannot be reconstructed.77
What remains at the moment is thus an exemplificatory reference in Decision
22/2016 (XII. 5.) to certain values as part of constitutional identity. These are
‘freedoms, the division of powers, republic as the form of government, respect of
autonomies under public law, the freedom of religion, exercising lawful authority,
parliamentarism, the equality of rights, acknowledging judicial power, the protection
of the nationalities living with us.’78
75On this, see Dupré (2015), p. 351 et seq.
76Constitutional Court of Hungary, Decision 22/2016 (XII. 5.) AB para. 64.
77Szente (2011), p. 1 et seq.
78Constitutional Court of Hungary, Decision 22/2016 (XII. 5.) AB para. 65.
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What makes the concept of constitutional identity intriguing is that it seems to
have a rank above the Basic Law. This follows from the language of Decision
22/2016. (XII. 5.) according to which ‘the constitutional identity of Hungary is a
fundamental value which was not created by the Basic Law, it is merely recognised
by the Basic Law’79 This clearly suggests the existence of pre-constitutional values
which serve as a standard for the actual written constitution, the Basic Law. And
because constitutional identity is defined by reference to the historic constitution,
and this concept is capable of having a variety of contents and meanings, the
Constitutional Court enjoys a considerable discretion in reviewing constitutional
amendments on the basis of constitutional identity.
3.2.2 International Law as a Standard of Interpretation of Constitutional
Provisions
For a long time, it seemed unclear, whether from the perspective of the Hungarian
constitutional order the role of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights is merely of non-binding, inspiring character, or whether the case law of the
Court should be deemed to define the scope and content of the respective rights, and
as such have a binding force.80
At the beginning, this question was answered almost unanimously in the nega-
tive. Representative of this was the view of the first President of the Hungarian
Constitutional Court, who argued that reference to the Strasbourg case law is merely
of auxiliary nature besides the reasoning of the Constitutional Court, and such
reference might also emphasize the importance of a specific rule of the Constitu-
tion.81 For two decades the Hungarian Court never went as far as to derive binding
constitutional standards from the Convention. Only once has the Constitutional
Court found that the understanding of the freedom of expression by the European
Court of Human Rights is ‘forming and binding the Hungarian jurisprudence.’82 Yet
this statement had no consequences in later decisions and the Court continued to
refer to the practice of the Convention without declaring them to be binding in the
interpretation of the Constitution.
79Constitutional Court of Hungary, Decision 22/2016 (XII. 5.) AB para. 67.
80This approach seems to follow from the Commentaries attached to the Charter of Fundamental
Rights. Cf. the comments on Article 52. (3) [2007] OJ C 303/33.
81Sólyom and Brunner (2000), p. 1317. This view was certainly in line with the case law of the
Bundesverfassungsgericht. Cf. BVerfG, Judgement of 14 October 2004, 2 BvR 1481/04, Görgülü,
para. 30–32, BVerfG, Judgment of 12 June 2018, 2 BvR 1738/12, Ban on strike action for civil
servants, para. 126: ‘Using them as guidelines for interpretation does not require that the statements
of the Basic Law and those of the European Convention on Human Rights be schematically aligned
or completely harmonised.’
82Constitutional Court of Hungary, 18/2004. (V. 25.) AB, ABH 2004, 303, 306. The Constitutional
Court referred to a series of judgments in this context, Hungary was not party to any of them.
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This picture seems to gradually change by decisions of the Court that actually
give effect to judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. The first instance
of this was a consequence of the Judgment Bukta and others v. Hungary.83 Here the
European Court of Human Rights ruled that the subjection of public assemblies to a
prior–authorisation procedure does not normally encroach upon the essence of
Article 11 of the Convention.84 But when an immediate response, in the form of a
demonstration, to a political event might be justified, a decision to disband the
ensuing, peaceful assembly solely because of the absence of the requisite prior
notice, without any illegal conduct by the participants, amounts to a disproportionate
restriction on freedom of peaceful assembly.85 Shortly after this judgment the
Constitutional Court decided on the constitutionality of the Act Nr. III of 1989 on
the right of assembly in its Decision Nr. 75/2008.86 This Decision actually comes to
the same conclusion as the ECHR. Yet the Hungarian Court merely refers to the
Bukta judgment in a brief paragraph, and the same paragraph also quotes the
jurisprudence of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht. The substantive argument
is solely based on Article 62 para. 1 of the Constitution. It appears that the Court did
not want to tie its hands for the future, even if it was ready to follow the path of
interpretation drawn by the European Court of Human Rights,87 and even if the
Constitutional Court is deciding on a statute the application of which was reviewed
by the European Court of Human Rights.
The breakthrough came with Decision Nr. 61/2011.88 Here the Court declared
clearly that it is under an obligation to follow the case law of the Convention in its
decisions interpreting the Constitution as long as the language of both corresponds.
In the words of the Court: ‘In the case of certain fundamental rights the Constitution
sets out the essential content of the fundamental right in the same fashion as an
international treaty (i.e. the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the European Convention on Human Rights). In these cases, the level of protection
for fundamental rights provided by the Constitutional Court may under no circum-
stances be lower than the level of international protection (typically elaborated by the
European Court of Human Rights). Therefore following from the principle of pacta
sunt servanda [Article 7 (1) Constitution Article Q (2)-(3) Basic Law] the Consti-
tutional Court has to follow the Strasbourg case law and the level of fundamental
rights protection defined therein even if this would not be necessitated by its
previous ‘precedents’.89 This statement was later referred to in Decision
Nr. 166/201190 and after the entry into force of the Basic Law in Decision
83ECtHR, Bukta and others v. Hungary, Judgment of 17 July 2007, Application no. 25691/04.
84Id. para. 35.
85Id. para. 36.
86Constitutional Court of Hungary, 75/2008. (V. 29.) AB, ABH 2008, 651.
87Id. 663 et seq.
88See Kovács (2013), p. 73 et seq.
89Constitutional Court of Hungary, 61/2011. (VII.13.) AB, ABH 2011, 321.
90Constitutional Court of Hungary, 166/2011. (XII.20.) AB, ABH 2011, 545.
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Nr. 43/2012.91 It occurs therefore that the rights of the Convention as interpreted by
the European Court of Human Rights are obligatory standards of interpretation of the
rights of the Basic Law at least in the sense that they provide for a minimum of
protection.92 Absent express provisions to the contrary in the language of the Basic
Law this shall help in maintaining European minimum standards domestically.
3.2.3 International Law as a Standard of Legality of the Constitution
The Hungarian Constitutional Court has already relied on international ius cogens to
define the eternal core of the constitution of Hungary in two of its decisions. Both
decisions were made in the context of a controversial constitutional amendment, yet
none of them actually found a violation of international ius cogens.
Decision 61/2011 (VII.13.) AB was made under the 1989 Constitution in a battle
between Parliament and the Constitutional Court over a piece of tax legislation. On
22 July 2010, the Hungarian Parliament adopted several economic and financial
Acts. The Act, inter alia, introduced a new punitive tax on certain payments for
employees of the public sector (civil servants, public servants, etc.) whose employ-
ment was terminated. Accordingly, severance payments and other payments related
to the termination of employment exceeding a certain amount became subject to a
98% tax. The proposal of the Act justified the punitive tax by reference to the needs
of the society to do justice, claiming that under the previous government public
employees had been granted immorally excessive severance payments. Although the
Act entered into force on 1 October 2010, the punitive tax was to be applied to the
relevant incomes starting from 1 January 2010. In order to ensure the constitution-
ality of this Act, Parliament also amended Article 70/I of the 1989 Constitution by
including a new paragraph (2) in the Article that allowed for special taxes.93
The punitive tax was challenged before the Constitutional Court within the
framework of an actio popularis, and the Court found the relevant provisions of
the Act to be unconstitutional in its Decision 184/2010 (X.28) AB, because, inter
alia, Article 70/I(2) of the Constitution did not cover the retroactive 98% tax.94
In response, Parliament reintroduced the 98% tax with certain modifications. At
the same time, Parliament modified Article 70/I(2) of the Constitution allowing for
retroactive taxation going back five years from the actual tax year. To prevent the
Constitutional Court from reviewing the legislation, a limitation was also introduced
91Constitutional Court of Hungary, 43/2012. (XII.20.) AB, ABH 2012, 320.
92In this sense Kovács (2013), p. 76.
93Article 70/I(2) of the Constitution (no longer in force): ‘In respect of any remuneration received
against the good morals from public funds, or from bodies entrusted to manage state assets and state
property, including bodies under majority state ownership or control, tax liabilities of a special
extent may be introduced on the strength of law, beginning with the given tax year.’
94Constitutional Court of Hungary, Decision 184/2010 (X.28) AB para. 900.
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in Article 32/A(2)–(3) of the Constitution, the language of which was basically
identical with what is today Article 37(4) of the Basic Law.
The Constitutional Court was confronted with this limitation on its powers in
Decision 61/2011 (VII.13.) AB where several petitioners challenged the constitu-
tional amendments that made the new Articles 32/A(2) and 70/I(2) part of the
Constitution. The Constitutional Court was not ready to find these amendments
unconstitutional but indicated that it might be ready to review constitutional amend-
ments on the basis of international law. The Decision stated that ‘norms, principles
and fundamental values of ius cogens together form a standard which all subsequent
constitutional amendments and the Constitution must comply with.’95
In spite of this clear language Decision 61/2011 (VII.13.) AB did not state clearly
that the Constitutional Court would possess the power to enforce these standards
against the constitution-making power. This came only after the entry into force of
the Basic Law in Decision 45/2012 (XII. 29.) of the Constitutional Court.
Decision 45/2012 (XII. 29.) concerned the Transitional Provisions to the Basic
Law. The Transitional Provisions were a document separate from the Basic Law but
it were, according to Point 3 of the Final Provisions of the Basic Law, to be adopted
by Parliament according to the rules of the previous Constitution on constitutional
amendments. Since these provisions were also the legal basis of the Basic Law itself,
it seemed reasonable to suppose that the constitution-maker intended to attribute to
the Transitional Provisions a rank similar to that of the Basic Law. This was
reinforced by the First Amendment to the Basic Law which inserted Point 5 in the
closing provisions of the Basic Law, according to which the Transitional Provisions
form an integral part of the Basic Law.
In its Decision 45/2012 (XII.29) AB, the Constitutional Court declared the
Transitional Provisions null and void.96 The core of the Court’s argument was that
Parliament had overstepped its constitutional authorisation when it implemented
regulations in the Transitional Provisions which had no transitional character. It was
probably to reduce confrontation with Parliament that the Constitutional Court
cautiously framed its ruling as the enforcement of formal rules and emphasised
that it did not review the merits of the Transitional Provisions. Still, the Decision also
seems to establish the power for itself to review the constitutionality of constitutional
amendments in its paragraph 118, which reads as follows: ‘Constitutional legality
has substantive criteria besides the procedural, formal, public law ones. [These are]
[t]he constitutional requirements of the democratic state under the rule of law,
constitutional values and principles acknowledged by democratic communities
under the rule of law and enshrined in international agreements, as well the
so-called ius cogens, which partly overlaps with these. Under certain circumstances
the Constitutional Court is empowered to review whether the substantive
95Constitutional Court of Hungary, Decision 61/2011. (VII.13.) AB, ABH 2011, 321.
96Constitutional Court of Hungary, Decision 45/2012 (XII.29) para. 347.
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constitutional requirements, guarantees and values of a democratic state under the
rule of law are consistently respected and included in the constitution.’97
It is remarkable that the Court here not only reiterated its findings on the role of
international ius cogens as a standard of review of the constitutional amendments,
but also claimed the power to carry out a substantive review of norms formally
incorporated into the Basic Law.
3.3 The European Convention on Human Rights
as a Standard of Review by the Constitutional Court
The Basic Law of Hungary seems to be surprisingly open towards international law.
Article Q (2) of the Basic Law provides that ‘Hungary shall ensure harmony between
international law and Hungarian law in order to fulfil its obligations under interna-
tional law.’ Further, according to Article Q (3) international treaties become part of
Hungarian Law upon their promulgation by a piece of Hungarian legislation. From
these it follows that international treaties promulgated by an Act of Parliament shall
take precedence over domestic legislation. This is supplemented by Section 32 of the
Constitutional Court Act which specifically entitles the Constitutional Court to
review the conformity of domestic legislation with international treaties. Should
such a procedure establish a conflict between an international treaty promulgated by
Act of Parliament and a domestic piece of legislation, the Constitutional Court is
obliged to declare the domestic law null and void. What is more, the already
mentioned limitation on the competences of the Constitutional Court in Article
37 (4) in relation to tax laws does not apply to this type of procedure. In effect, the
combination of these provisions enables the Constitutional Court to conduct review
on the basis of international law.
The real question is who may initiate this type of review. The European Conven-
tion on Human Rights was promulgated in the Hungarian legal order by Act
Nr. XXXI of 1993, and therefore can be invoked by individuals before ordinary
courts. Yet individuals are not listed in Section 32 (2) amongst those entitled to
request the review of conflict with international treaties.98 Nevertheless concrete,
incidental norm control is open under Section 33 (2) of the Constitutional Court Act,
which provides that ‘judges shall suspend judicial proceedings and initiate Consti-
tutional Court proceedings if, in the course of the adjudication of a concrete case,
97Id., paras. 347, 403.
98Section 32 (2) CC Act ‘The proceedings may be requested by one quarter of Members of
Parliament, the Government, the President of the Curia, the Prosecutor General or the Commis-
sioner for Fundamental Rights. Judges shall suspend judicial proceedings and initiate Constitutional
Court proceedings if, in the course of the adjudication of a concrete case, they are bound to apply a
legal regulation that they perceive to be contrary to an international treaty.’
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they are bound to apply a legal regulation that they perceive to be contrary to an
international treaty.’
As a result, ordinary courts are not only bound to apply the applicable Hungarian
laws and interpret them in conformity with the Convention as far as possible.99
Should a harmonious interpretation not be possible because of the express language
of the Hungarian law in question, courts are entitled to call upon the Constitutional
Court and ask for a review of the Hungarian piece of legislation on the basis of
international treaties, notably the European Convention on Human Rights. In case of
a conflict the Constitutional Court is obliged to declare the Hungarian law in
question unconstitutional.
4 Conclusions
The present Chapter attempted to demonstrate that the enforcement of the basic
values of the EU by courts has unexploited potentials. It occurs that both the legal
system of the EU and Hungarian constitutional law offers possibilities that are not
used for considerations of non-legal nature.
In the case of the CJEU, deference to constitutional courts, especially the
Bundesverfassungsgericht and an outdated approach to fundamental rights protec-
tion are a crucial shortcoming. As demonstrated by the Siragusa judgment, the
CJEU seems to regard the protection of fundamental rights protection as a means
of preventing challenges to the supremacy of EU law by national constitutional
courts. I submit that this mid 1960s understanding does not fit the state of the EU as it
is in the 2010s, at least for two reasons. First, the constitutional foundations of the
EU have changed radically. Second, the realities changed with the accession of
Member States with more fragile democratic traditions and by the rise of populist
parties all over Europe.
As regards the changed constitutional foundations, the express stipulation of
constitutional values in Article 2 TEU clearly calls for the application of the Charter
as the concretisation of these values also against Member States. Besides, the EU is
equipped with far reaching consequences in the field of criminal cooperation and the
mandate to facilitate the full application of the principle of mutual recognition by
virtue of Article 70 TFEU.
Changed realities are clear from the developments in Hungary, Romania100 and
the subject matter of the present volume, Poland. It occurs that the presumption of an
approximately homogenic area of the rule of law no longer applies and certain
99Such a harmonious interpretation is a constitutional mandate repeatedly confirmed by the
Constitutional Court. Cf. Constitutional Court of Hungary 53/1993 (X. 13.) AB, ABH 1993,
323, 327; Constitutional Court of Hungary, 4/1997. (I. 22.) AB, ABH 1997, 41, 51.
100For these see inter alia von Bogdandy and Sonnevend (2015).
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Member States do not meet all supposedly common standards of fundamental rights
protection and the rule of law.
The implications and eventual perils following from the changed constitutional
and sociological realities are aptly demonstrated by the Aranyosi101 and LM102 line
of cases. Especially LM demonstrates that mutual recognition and mutual trust
presuppose a coherent level of respect for human rights in all EU Member States.
If this is missing, the whole fabric of EU law may fall apart. As a result, the
protection of fundamental rights by Member States is a common concern.
The situation of the Hungarian Constitutional Court is different in many respects.
Constitutional adjudication against the constitution making power is a seemingly
insurmountable task, especially when the constitution making power is not separated
from the legislative power. This situation requires extreme means like the concept of
an unconstitutional constitution. These means are, however, readily available. Both
the new concept of constitutional identity and the case law on international ius
cogens as a binding standard of constitutional provisions offer munition for extreme
situations. These possibilities, I believe, exist even in the face of Article 25 (4) of the
Basic Law, which enables the Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of
Amendments of the Basic Law only on procedural grounds.103 In an already extreme
situation triggering the application of the constitutional identity of the Basic Law or
international ius cogens it is possible to argue that any competence limitation in
Article 25 (4) of the Basic Law is also in violation of said supra-constitutional norms.
Besides these extreme situations the European Convention on Human Rights
offers a perfect secondary tool of constitutional adjudication through the procedure
of review of conformity of laws with international treaties. This has remained thus
far completely underexplored and unused by the Constitutional Court. This, I
submit, is a self-restraint that does not follow from the law as it stands today.
The phenomenon of constitutional adjudication was borne for the first time out of
the consideration that courts are inherently called upon to apply the law, and the
concept of law necessarily encompasses the constitution. As the US Supreme Court
stated in Marbury v. Madison ‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
Judicial Department to say what the law is.’104 The birth of modern constitutionalism
101CJEU, Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, Judgment of the Court of
5 April 2016.
102CJEU, C-216/18 PPU. LM, Judgment of the Court of 25 July 2018.
103Article 25 (4) of the Basic Law: ‘The Constitutional Court may review the Basic Law and an
amendment to the Basic Law only with respect to the procedural requirements set out in the Basic
Law pertaining to the adoption and the promulgation of the Basic Law and any amendment thereof.
This review may be initiated by:
a) the President of the Republic, in the case where the Fundamental Law or an amendment to the
Basic Law was adopted by Parliament but not yet promulgated;
b) the Government, one fourth of all Members of Parliament, the President of the Kúria, President
of the Közigazgatási Felsőbíróság, the Prosecutor General, or the Commissioner for Funda-
mental Rights within thirty days of promulgation.’
104Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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is thus intimately linked to the responsibility of the courts to enforce the constitu-
tional documents of the respective polity. All courts shall follow the mandate
resulting from this and apply all available means in order to preserve the common
basic values of constitutionalism.
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